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ResearchPaper
2009
Government decentralization as a disincentive for transnational terror? : an empirical analysis
Government decentralization as a disincentive for transnational terror? : an empirical analysis
Abstract (English)
Using panel data for a maximum of 109 countries over the years 1976-2000, we empirically analyze the impact of decentralization on the occurrence of transnational terror. Our results show that expenditure decentralization reduces the number of transnational terror events in a country, while political decentralization has no impact. These results are robust to the choice of control variables and method of estimation.
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Notes
Publication license
Publication series
Hohenheimer Diskussionsbeiträge; 313
Published in
Other version
Faculty
Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences
Institute
Institut für Betriebswirtschaftslehre (bis 2010)
Examination date
Supervisor
Edition / version
Citation
Identification
DOI
ISSN
ISBN
Language
English
Publisher
Publisher place
Classification (DDC)
330 Economics
Original object
Free keywords
Terrorism Decentralization Federalism Governance quality Government
Standardized keywords (GND)
Terrorismus Politische Steuerung Dezentralisation
Sustainable Development Goals
BibTeX
@techreport{Fischer2009,
url = {https://hohpublica.uni-hohenheim.de/handle/123456789/5265},
author = {Fischer, Justina A. V. and Dreher, Axel},
title = {Government decentralization as a disincentive for transnational terror? : an empirical analysis},
year = {2009},
school = {Universität Hohenheim},
series = {Hohenheimer Diskussionsbeiträge},
}